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Family-friendly policies allow workers to meet their family responsibilities, along with their 
work responsibilities. Family-friendly policies often entail a “flexible workplace,” where the 
workday or workplace can be altered according to the family and caring responsibilities of the 
worker.  This report looks at two types of flexible workplace policies—scheduling flexibility and 
access to leave for the birth of a child (a form of anticipated leave)— and finds that they have 
either positive effects or little to no effect on wages. 
 
Workplace flexibility can take the following forms: 
 
•  Scheduling flexibility. Allows workers to set or alter their day-to-day schedule. 
•  Unanticipated leave. Allows workers to take leave for personal obligations, such as 
taking care of a sick child or attending a parent-teacher meeting. 
•  Anticipated paid leave. Gives workers time off for vacations, longer-term illnesses, and 
family caregiving. 
•  Work location. Offers flexibility in the location of work, allowing employees to 
telecommute. 
•  Career flexibility.  Offers workers the chance to move in and out of the labor market, as 
necessary, to balance their work and family life. 
 
Access to workplace flexibility has real implications for wages. The ability to take time off with 
leave can protect workers against future earnings losses. The present-day wages of mothers who 
worked prior to the birth of their first child and received pay during their maternity leave are 9 
percent higher than for mothers who had not taken leave (controlling for other personal and job-
related characteristics). Thus, leave policy can limit the long-term effects of stepping out of the 
labor market to provide family care. 
 
Mothers who report working their current schedule because it helps them address their caring 
responsibilities—child care, elder care, or care for a sick family member—do not suffer a wage 
penalty as a result. The effect of a flexible schedule on wages is negligible. However, this model 
controls for occupation, industry, and part-time status, all of which do affect wages. Since many 
mothers work part-time to address their caring responsibilities, these mothers may suffer a wage 
penalty for part-time work. 
 
Corporate America cannot create flexible workplaces on their own; they need the government to 
regulate labor markets, establish standards, and prevent a race to the bottom.  Relying on the 
goodwill of employers has meant that many workers, especially low-wage workers, do not have 
access to any kind of workplace flexibility. Uniform standards remove workplace flexibility 
from the realm of competition, allowing us to focus on what workers need, rather than 
competition among companies, as the focal point of policy. We can no longer view the rigidities 
of the workplace as an individual problem; rather, we must view them as a threat to all families 
and something that must be dealt with by policy. 
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Women’s earnings are an increasingly important part of total family income. Over the past few 
decades, mothers’ employment rates have risen considerably and their earnings now comprise 
about two-fifths of family income. As more mothers now remain in the labor market while they 
have children in the home, new questions have arisen concerning how parents can balance their 
work responsibilities with the caring needs of their families.  
 
Most workers arrive on the job at times that suit their employer, having little or no say about 
their schedule. For parents, this can pose difficulties, as they may need to coordinate their work 
hours with their child’s daycare provider or school schedule. Further, most workers do not have 
access to paid sick leave or other paid leave that would allow them to take time off work when 
they—or their children—need extra care.  
 
“Family-friendly” policies, in the form of workplace flexibility, can provide parents with the 
flexibility and time off that they need to balance their work responsibilities with their 
commitment to their family. Workplace flexibility policies range from reduced hours or flexible 
schedules to time off to care for a family member.  
 
Taking advantage of workplace flexibility may, however, entail costs such as lower wages or 
fewer fringe benefits. For example, it is often noted that part-time work, which parents may 
choose in order to have more family time, results in lower wages compared to other comparably 
skilled workers. On the other hand, these policies may increase the ability of mothers to remain 
in the labor market, thus improving their earnings over time compared to those mothers who 
drop out of the labor force. 
 
This report looks at two specific kinds of workplace flexibility—scheduling flexibility and 
access to leave for the birth of a child (a form of anticipated leave)—and finds that they have 
either positive effects or little or no effect on mothers wages. Mothers who worked before the 
birth of their first child and had access to paid leave for maternity have present-day wages that 
are 9 percent higher than mothers who had not taken leave, controlling for the mother’s personal 
and job-related characteristics. There was no effect on wages for mothers who self-financed their 
maternity leave.   
 
Being able to choose a schedule that fits with caring responsibilities does not appear to lower 
wages. Mothers who reported that they were working a particular schedule because it fit in with 
their caring responsibilities have wages that are not statistically different from mothers who have 
no choice about their schedules. Thus, having this kind of flexibility does not entail a price for 
mothers, once we account for part-time status.  
 
These findings should focus policymakers’ attention on what “works” for working parents, and 
the role that social policy can play in improving labor market outcomes for workers across the 
wage distribution. If workplace flexibility can help parents by improving their options for 
work/family balance without creating wage penalties, then policymakers should focus on ways to 
  3extend these policies to more workers and to create labor standards that recognize the importance 





Family-friendly policies allow workers to meet their family responsibilities, along with their 
work responsibilities. Family-friendly policies often entail a “flexible workplace,” where the 
workday or workplace can be altered according to the family and caring responsibilities of the 
worker. Flexible workplaces can take many forms, but the unifying characteristic is that the 
policy allows the worker some control over their workday. Employees in a flexible workplace 
may be able to set their starting and ending hours of work; they might be able to determine when 
to take a break or whether to take a day (with pay) to care for a sick child, tend to their own 
illness, or meet other personal needs; or they might be able to take planned, paid leave for a 
vacation, to recover from an illness, or when a new child comes into their family.  
 
A flexible workplace is not the same thing as a flexible labor market, which usually entails non-
traditional schedules or non-standard work. This kind of flexibility suits the employer, rather 
than the employee. Non-standard employment can take many forms, but the basic premise is that 
the worker has little or no control over their workday. For example, many workers are required 
to work overtime with little or no warning. This provides the employer with the flexibility to 
evaluate immediate work needs, but gives the employee little leeway to cope with finding child-
care or addressing other personal or family needs. 
 
Scheduling flexibility. One of the most common kinds of workplace flexibility is scheduling 
flexibility. Some workers are able to choose their own hours based on their personal needs or 
may choose a specific job because it gives them the flexibility necessary to address work/family 
issues. Scheduling flexibility can take many forms, but essentially it revolves around whether or 
not a worker can set or alter their day-to-day schedule. Workers may be able to set hours around 
a “core” set of hours that they must be at work, for example, working eight hours per day as long 
as they are at the office between 10:00 am and 4:00 pm. Such flexibility implies being able to set 
these hours at some regular interval—such as daily, monthly, or quarterly. Scheduling flexibility 
implies that the worker does not have alternating schedules imposed on them. 
 
Anticipated leave. A second type of workplace flexibility is anticipated leave to care for young 
children or a sick family member. This leave can be paid or unpaid. To be family friendly, 
however, the leave must be scheduled by the worker, at their convenience. The Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides workers (employed for at least 1,200 hours over the past 
year at a firm employing 50 or more workers) with 12 weeks of unpaid leave for their own 
illness, to care for a new child (adopted, foster, or birth), or to care for a sick family member. 
This legislation was lauded as a linchpin in meeting the family care needs of workers, who 
previously had no guarantee of time off to care for their families’ needs. In important respects, 
the FMLA was a significant step in solving the problem of care brought on by the widespread 
employment of mothers. However, the restrictions on the FMLA make it less likely that women 
will qualify, since they are more likely to work part-time and at small firms, and the fact that it is 
unpaid may discourage its use, especially among the neediest populations. 
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Unanticipated paid leave. Other kinds of workplace flexibility policies include short- or 
medium-term unanticipated paid leave, which enables workers to deal with unanticipated or 
irregularly occurring events. This includes being able to “step out of the office” for a few hours 
to go to a parent-teacher meeting or being able to call in sick on the morning that a child comes 
down with the flu without worrying about losing a day’s pay. This flexibility requires the 
availability of paid sick leave policies, both for the worker’s illness and that of a close family 
member, and flexible workplace practices that allow this leave to be taken as needed in short 
time increments.  
 
Location of work. Workplace flexibility policies can also include discretion over the location of 
work. Some workers get workplace flexibility by being able to work at a satellite office closer to 
home, to work at home, or to telecommute regularly.  
 
Career flexibility. Workplace flexibility policies can help create career flexibility for workers as 
they move through their life-cycle. This entails the option to move in and out of the labor market 
over time as family and personal needs change. This may entail short-term income penalties, but 
stepping out of the labor market for a year to care for an ailing parent or child, or recover from a 
serious illness, should not spell the end of one’s career.  
  
The key to workplace flexibility is that participation is at the worker’s discretion, the timing suits 
the worker, and it does not entail pay or promotion penalties. Working parents, and workers 
more generally, have commitments over which they have little control, such as the time that their 
child’s school opens and closes, the hours that their daycare provider works, or accidents such as 
when an aging parent takes a fall and needs care. Workplace flexibility—if it is voluntary and if 
workers feel that they may take advantage of it—gives workers the ability to address these issues 
and find solutions that work for them and their employer. 
 
Workplace Flexibility: How Common Is It? 
 
This analysis focuses in on two specific kinds of workplace flexibility: access to maternity leave 
for the birth of a child, a form of anticipated leave, and scheduling flexibility. Access to these 
kinds of workplace flexibility is far from universal, even for working mothers. The data for this 
analysis come from the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP). The sample for this analysis consists of mothers aged 25 to 54 who worked 




Access to maternity leave is more common than scheduling flexibility (Table 1). Mothers can 
report up to 15 different kinds of activities upon the birth of their first child and these are 
grouped into three categories: (1) the mother received pay during her maternity leave—through 
paid maternity leave, or by using paid sick or disability leave, paid vacation, or other paid leave; 
                                                 
2 The SIPP only asks questions about leave-taking of mothers, thus this analysis is unfortunately unable to include 
an analysis that includes fathers. 
  5(2) the mother “self-financed” her leave—through quitting her job, or using any kind of unpaid 
leave; or (3) the mother took no leave at all.
3 Very few mothers took no leave at the birth of a 
child—only 1.8 percent of those currently employed and 1.9 percent of those not currently 
employed. Among those currently employed, 58.3 percent had self-financed their maternity 
leave, while 47.6 had received some pay during maternity leave. Mothers not currently employed 
are more likely to have had to self-finance their maternity leave, at 71.1 percent, while less than a 
third (32.5 percent) had pay during maternity leave. 
 
Table 1. Mothers' access to workplace flexibility   
Percent       
    
   Currently employed  Currently not employed 
Access to maternity leave for birth of first 
child    
Received pay during maternity leave  47.6  32.5 
Self-financed maternity leave  58.3  71.1 
Did not stop working when child born  1.8  1.9 
    
Scheduling flexibility      
Schedule suits personal needs (school, 
second job, other)  10.8   
Schedule suits caring needs (child care, 
elder care, other)  22.3   
    
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels. 
Notes: Sample is mothers age 25 to 54 who worked prior to the birth of their first child. 
 
Mothers have scheduling flexibility when they report that they have their current work schedule 
either because it helps them to address a caring responsibility, including child care, elder care, or 
care for a sick family member, or because it meets their needs in any other way, such as school 
or a second job. No scheduling flexibility is when the mother reports that they are working their 
current schedule because it is the only schedule offered or because it suits their employer’s 
needs. The bottom panel of Table 1 shows that relatively few mothers have access to scheduling 
flexibility. Among working mothers, one fifth (22.3 percent) reported that they worked their 
schedule because it suited their caring needs. One-in-ten (10.8 percent) reported that they had 
their current schedule in order to address any other personal needs, such as school or a second 
job.  
 
Table 2 shows more detail on the kinds of maternity leaves that mothers took and how this 
differs by the educational attainment of the mother. The majority of mothers who worked prior to 
the birth of their first child took some type of leave. Overall, 28.5 percent of mothers had paid 
                                                 
3 The data only includes information on births that occurred up to 16 years ago. See the Appendix for more 
information on the data and methods. 
  6maternity leave and another 18.4 percent used other paid leave after their first child was born. 
The share of first time mothers who received pay during maternity is 42.9 percent. 
 
The share of mothers who “self-financed” their maternity leave—using either unpaid leaves or 
leaving their jobs—is 62.3 percent, higher than the share who had received some pay. The 
differences by educational attainment are striking: among mothers who have no more than a 
high-school degree, 70.3 percent bore the costs of maternity without any paid leave and only 
32.9 percent had any paid leave. Among mothers with at least some college, 47.1 percent had 
some pay during maternity leave and 59.0 percent self-financed their maternity leave. Nearly 
one-quarter of all mothers (24.3 percent) quit working when they had their first child, however 
among mothers without more than a high-school degree, the share who quit was higher, 30.7 
percent, and among mothers with at least some college, the share was lower, 21.5 percent.  
 
Table 2. Leaves and other actions upon birth of first child, by educational 
attainment 
Percent          
     
  Stopped working at birth of first child 
   All 
High-school 
diploma or less 
Some college or 
more 
Received pay during maternity leave       
Paid maternity leave  28.5  22.5  31.0 
Used other paid leave for maternity 
(including sick leave, disability, and 
vacation)  18.4 12.3 21.1 
Total  42.9 32.9 47.1 
     
Self-financed maternity leave       
Quit  24.3 30.7 21.5 
Let  go  2.0 2.4 1.8 
Unpaid maternity leave  25.9  26.9  25.4 
Used other unpaid leave for maternity 
(including sick leave and vacation)  6.6 6.6 6.6 
Other (including self-employed and 
employer went out of business)  4.4 4.1 4.6 
Total  62.3 70.0 59.0 
     
Did not stop working  1.8  1.6  1.9 
     
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels. 
Notes: Sample is mothers age 25 to 54 who worked prior to the birth of their first child. Columns do 
not sum to 100 percent because mothers may take more than one type of leave. 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the leave or other events that occurred when mothers had their first child, by the 
mother’s educational attainment. Mothers with less education were more likely to quit and to be 
let go from their job, compared to mothers with more education. Mothers with more education, 
  7however, were more likely to have access to paid maternity leave or to use other paid leave, 




Workplace Flexibility: How Beneficial Is It to Working Mothers’ 
Wages? 
 
A goal of workplace flexibility is to positively affect mothers’ employment patterns by helping 
them return to work after the birth of a child. However, the potential effects of workplace 
flexibility on wages are less clear. Access to workplace flexibility should make it easier for 
mothers to balance their jobs with their family responsibilities, thus making it more likely that 
mothers do not need to exit employment because of family stresses. Thus, all else equal, mothers 
with workplace flexibility should be more likely to stay employed. In terms of wages, on the one 
hand, over time, one would expect higher wages as mothers become less likely to drop out of the 
labor force. On the other, it may be that mothers pay a price for these “perks” in terms of lower 
wages or benefits or, if workplace flexibility puts mothers on a “mommy track,” they may gain 
access to employment, but lose out on wages.  
 
Lack of access to leave may be part of the reason for mother’s lower wages. On average, mothers 
are paid less than other women, and all women earn less, on average, than men. This gender pay 
gap has been studied extensively and while some of the gap is due to differences between men 
and women in human capital and the characteristics of the jobs they hold (Blau and Kahn 2000), 
  8research has also found that part of the gap is to the presence of children (Budig and England 
2001). Women who have children move onto a lower earnings profile, relative to women who 
have not (Waldfogel 1998b). Access to workplace flexibility may mitigate this “family gap” in 
pay: research has found that women with access to leave have wages that are higher, compared 
to mothers who did not have access to leave (Waldfogel 1998a).  
 
Mother’s Wages are Higher if They Received Pay During Maternity Leave 
 
Mothers who had access to paid leave for the birth of their first child earn more now than 
mothers who did not take such leave, but having scheduling flexibility has no significant effect 
on wages (Table 3). The table shows the overall effect of maternity leave and scheduling 
flexibility on mother’s current wages, controlling for the mother’s personal and job-related 
characteristics, including age, race/ethnicity, citizenship, educational attainment, part-time hours, 
union, region, year, and 14 occupation and 23 industry dummies. (See the Appendix for a 
complete description of the regression estimates.) 
  
Mothers who took maternity leave and received pay have current wages that are 8.9 percent 
higher than mothers who either took no leave or self-financed their maternity leave. Self-
financing a maternity leave has no discernable effect on current wages, so there is not a long-
term penalty for this, at least for first-time mothers.  
 
Working a flexible schedule does not have a statistically significant effect on mother’s wages. 
However, it is important to note that the model accounts for part-time status, which does have a 
significant negative effect on wages of 7.7 percent (shown in Appendix), as well as industry and 
occupation. Thus, mothers who work a flexible schedule that is part-time to care for their 
children after school may indeed face a wage penalty. Further, it may be that some occupations 
are more open to flexibility and thus controlling for occupation would reduce the significance of 
why a mother had her current schedule because the negative (or positive) effects of the schedule 
may be captured by the occupation. However, given this, scheduling flexibility on its own does 
not create a penalty for mother’s wages. 
 
Table 4 breaks down leave-taking into more detail. Mothers who had access to paid maternity 
leave, without using other paid leave, such as sick leave or vacation, have current wages that are 
6.5 percent higher than mothers who did not take leave. However, once the detail is exposed, 
there is a penalty for quitting—of -8.0 percent—upon the birth of a mother’s first child. Other 
kinds of leaves and scheduling flexibility remain statistically insignificant. 
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wages 
Percent    
  
  
Percent change in 
current wages 
Access to maternity leave for birth of first child   
Received pay during maternity leave  8.9*** 
Self-financed maternity leave  -1.5 
  
Scheduling flexibility    
Schedule suits personal needs (school, second job, other)  -0.6 
Schedule suits caring needs (child care, elder care, other)  1.7 
  
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels. 
Notes: Estimates are from regressions including age, race, citizenship, educational 
attainment, part-time hours, union, 14 occupations, 23 industries, region, and year 
dummies. See Appendix for full results. 
*** statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
Table 4. Effects of leave-taking and flexibility on mother's current 
wages, detailed 
Percent    
  
  
Percent change in 
current wages 
Detailed access to maternity leave for birth of first child   
Received pay during maternity leave   
Paid maternity leave  6.5*** 
Used other paid leave for maternity (including sick leave, 
disability, and vacation)  4.8 
Self-financed maternity leave   
Quit when had child  -8.0*** 
Let go when had child  -2.9 
Unpaid maternity leave  -1.3 
Used other unpaid leave for maternity (including sick 
leave and vacation)  -2.3 
Other (including self-employed and employer went out of
business) -1.5 
  
Scheduling flexibility    
Schedule suits personal needs (school, second job, other)  -0.6 
Schedule suits caring needs (child care, elder care, other)  1.7 
  
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels. 
Notes: See notes to Table 3. 
*** statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Benefits of Maternity Leave Differ by Mother’s Education 
 
The U.S. labor is highly segmented and jobs that require less skill also generally pay less and 
offer fewer benefits. This might have an effect both on the potential of leaves being offered 
mothers as well as the costs or benefits of taking leave or staying continuously in the labor 
market. Mothers with more educational attainment are less likely to have quit their job upon the 
birth of their first child and more likely to have had access to paid maternity leave (Table 5). 
Having received pay during maternity leave leads to a larger effect on current wages for women 
with no more than a high-school degree, a 13.6 percent increase, compared to women with at 
least some college where the increase is only 8.3 percent. This may be because having access to 
pay is much less likely for less educated women; those that have it may have exceptionally good 
jobs or supportive employers, which helps them later during their careers.  
 
Looking at detailed access to maternity leave, access to paid maternity leave helps the current 
wages of both groups of women, increasing wages by 7.0 percent for women with no more than 
a high-school degree and 6.5 percent for women with some college or more. However, the 
effects of quitting are only significant for women with at least some college: their wages are 9.2 
percent lower, compared to not taking leave. Quitting has a statistically insignificant effect on the 
current wages of women with no more than a high-school degree. For professional women, or 
women who have invested time and energy into training and education to get themselves on a 
career path, quitting work appears to be more detrimental to their earnings power relative to 
women who are less educated and have invested less in their “human capital” and earning 
potential. 
 
Scheduling flexibility continues to have no discernable effect on mother’s wages. Because the 
estimates control for part-time status and the kind of job, this finding is important because it 
implies that the use of a flexible schedule in and of itself does not lead to lower wages, 
regardless of which educational grouping the mother is in. 
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educational attainment 
Percent 
    
  Percent change in current wages 
  
No more than high-
school degree 
Some college or 
more 
Access to maternity leave for birth of first child     
Received pay during maternity leave  13.6***  8.3*** 
Self-financed maternity leave  5.1  -2.4 
    
Detailed access to maternity leave for birth of first child     
Received pay during maternity leave     
Paid maternity leave  7.0*  6.5** 
Used other paid leave for maternity (including sick 
leave, disability, and vacation)  12.4 3.4 
Self-financed maternity leave     
Quit when had child  -2.2  -9.2*** 
Let go when had child  11.3  -8.6 
Unpaid maternity leave  1.1  -1 
Used other unpaid leave for maternity (including sick 
leave and vacation)  3.6 -3.7 
Other (including self-employed and employer went out 
of business)  0.8 -0.8 
    
Scheduling flexibility      
Schedule suits personal needs (school, second job, other)  -0.8  -1.0 
Schedule suits caring needs (child care, elder care, other)  3.7  0.6 
    
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels. 
Notes: See notes to Table 3. 
*** statistically significant at the 1 percent level; ** statistically significant at the 5 percent level;  
* statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
Leave-Taking is Associated with Longer Employment Tenure and Greater Likelihood of 
Going Back to Work After Maternity Leave 
 
The effects of maternity leave on current wages likely works through the probability of going 
back to work and staying employed after the birth of a child. Table 6 evaluates the probability of 
current employment for mothers who had taken leave upon the birth of their first child. The rows 
in this table indicate whether and what kind of leave a mother took; the “No” column indicates 
that the mother did not have the row’s characteristic, and the “Yes” column indicates that she 
did. The “Difference” column indicates the effect of having that characteristic. Thus, reading 
across the first row, “received pay during maternity leave,” mothers who had this benefit have a 
78.7 probability of currently being employed, 13.5 percentage points higher than mothers who 
did not have pay. Mothers who self-finance their maternity leave are no more likely to still be 
  12employed, and are less likely to currently be employed (72.1 percent) than mothers who received 
pay during maternity leave. 
 
Looking at the detailed analysis, the most important factors in changing the predicted current 
employment are whether a mother used other paid leave, such as sick leave or vacation, for her 
maternity, or whether she quit. Mothers who used other paid leave are 10.2 percentage points 
more likely to be currently employed, for a 79.7 likelihood of currently being employed. Mothers 
who quit are 10.2 percentage points less likely to currently be employed, for a 63.7 probability of 
current employment. 
 
Table 6. Effects of leave-taking after the birth of the first child on probability of 
current employment 
Discrete Predicted Probabilities    
        
   No  Yes  Difference 
Access to maternity leave for birth of first child         
Received pay during maternity leave  65.2  78.7  13.5*** 
Self-financed maternity leave  70.3  72.1  1.8 
        
Detailed access to maternity leave for birth of first child         
Received pay during maternity leave         
Paid maternity leave  70.6  74.0  3.4*** 
Used other paid leave for maternity (including sick leave, 
disability, and vacation)  69.5  79.7  10.2*** 
Self-financed maternity leave         
Quit when had child  73.9  63.7  -10.2** 
Let go when had child  71.7  66.2  -5.5 
Unpaid maternity leave  71.2  72.8  1.6*** 
Used other unpaid leave for maternity (including sick leave 
and vacation)  71.6  71.7  0.2 
Other (including self-employed and employer went out of 
business)  72.2 56.1 -16.1  
        
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels. 
Notes: Estimates are from regressions including number and age of children, age, race, citizenship, 
educational attainment, marital status, region, year, and dummies indicating the number of labor market 
breaks the woman has ever taken. See Appendix for full results. 
*** statistically significant at the 1 percent level; ** statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
However, current likelihood of employment does not tell us whether this is because the mother 
quit stopped work with she had her first child, or later in her career. Table 7 shows that most 
women returned to work after their first child was born, with over 90 percent who had access to 
either paid or self-financed leave returning to work, on average. Women least likely to return to 
work were those who quit, where they only had a 79.8 probability of returning to work, 15.7 
percentage points less than if they had not quit. Being let go also significantly reduced the 
likelihood of returning to work, by 12.4 percentage points. Since receiving pay increases the 
likelihood of returning to work, this may also affect the likelihood of future employment. 
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child born 
Discrete Predicted Probabilities 
        
   No  Yes  Difference
Access to maternity leave for birth of first child         
Received pay during maternity leave  89.7  95.1  5.4***
Self-financed maternity leave  94.1  91.3  -2.8***
        
Detailed access to maternity leave for birth of first child         
Received pay during maternity leave         
Paid maternity leave  92.9  94.4  1.6***
Used other paid leave for maternity (including sick leave, 
disability, and vacation)  93.0  94.8  1.8***
Self-financed maternity leave         
Quit when had child  95.5  79.8  -15.7***
Let go when had child  93.5  81.1  -12.4***
Unpaid maternity leave  93.2  93.6  0.4***
Used other unpaid leave for maternity (including sick 
leave and vacation)  93.3  93.6  0.3 
Other (including self-employed and employer went out of 
business)  93.5 87.6 -6.0* 
        
Source: Author's analysis of SIPP 1996 and 2001 panels. 
Notes : See notes to Table 6.         





This report finds that having access to workplace flexibility raises women’s earnings at best and, 
at worst, does not hurt them. Under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), about half of 
women in the U.S. labor market currently have access to unpaid leave for the birth or adoption of 
a child or to care for a sick family member. However, just over half do not have access. Moving 
towards universality in access to leave could help to close the gap in women’s pay and could 
help more women stay in the labor market over time. 
 
Over their lifetimes, women earn less than half of what men earn; over a 15 year period, prime-
age women workers earn 38 percent of what men earn (Hartmann and Rose 2004). Recent 
research has pointed to the presence of children and the lack of family-friendly policies as one of 
the most important factors explaining women’s lower lifetime earnings. The “family gap” is the 
gap among women between those with and without children. As with the gender gap, much of 
the family gap is explained by workers’ demographics, educational attainment, job 
characteristics, and years of experience. The unexplained portion of the family gap—the gap due 
to the presence of children—is about 5 percent (Budig and England 2001), some of which may 
be due to leave-taking or breaks in employment for caring for families.  
 
  14Family-friendly policies may mitigate the family gap in pay. A cross-country comparison of 
seven industrialized nations finds that the family gap is largest in the United Kingdom, followed 
by the other Anglo-American nations and Germany (Harkness and Waldfogel 1999). Parents in 
Anglo-American nations have less access to family-friendly policies. Researchers point to these 
differences in maternity and child care policies in creating differences in the family gap across 
countries. 
 
The returns to having paid maternity leave are high, however, the costs of providing this leave 
are relatively low. A recent estimate for the state of Massachusetts found that implementing a 
paid parental leave program of 12 weeks at 50 percent of wages would incur an annual cost on 
every worker in the state of between $19 and $22—about the price of two movie tickets (Albelda 
and Clayton-Matthews 2005). Thus, a small investment up front can lead to significant gains for 
working mothers over the rest of their careers. 
 
One thing is certain: We cannot rely on the private sector to voluntarily provide all workers with 
workplace flexibility. This analysis finds that most mothers—especially those without any 
college—did not have pay during maternity leave for the birth of their first child. Workplaces 
have not created broad paid family leave programs on the heels of the FMLA. We can no longer 
view the rigidities of the workplace as an individual problem; rather, we must view them as 
something that poses a threat to all families and is something that must be dealt with by policy. 
 
There is some movement in this direction. In 2002, California Governor Gray Davis signed a bill 
providing workers with paid leave to care for a sick family member or bond with a new child. 
This legislation, which took effect in June 2004, is the first of its kind in the United States. This 
law pays workers 55 to 60 percent of wages (subject to a cap) for six weeks of leave and is 
financed entirely by payroll taxes on employees. Other states are working towards implementing 
their own paid leave legislation; such legislation just passed the Senate in Washington State, for 
example. 
 
Workers need access to workplace flexibility to allow them coordinate their personal lives with 
their work lives. Employers need government intervention to level the playing field. Employers 
who offer workplace flexibility should not bear the full costs of implementing good workplace 
practices, while other employers are allowed to ignore their employees’ needs. Nationally 
applicable labor standards should include workplace flexibility policies, such as access to paid 
leaves and flexible scheduling. Relying on the goodwill of employers has meant that many 
workers, especially low-wage workers, do not have access to any kind of flexibility. The 
solutions to this problem are to be found not only in employer policies, but through broader 
universal policy solutions as well. 
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This analysis makes use of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP). The SIPP is a multi-panel, longitudinal survey of the civilian, non-
institutional population in the United States, conducted by the U.S. Census. It is designed to 
examine issues related to participation in income maintenance programs, such as welfare and 
unemployment insurance and contains extensive information on individuals’ backgrounds, 
employment and earnings, and access to services, including health insurance and child-care. 
Unlike other available longitudinal datasets, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics or 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, it covers all workers and contains monthly, rather than 
annual data.  
 
The SIPP data are structured so that every month one-fourth of the sample is interviewed; over 
each four-month interval (a “wave”), all sample members are interviewed. During each wave, 
respondents are asked a set of core questions, which cover labor market participation, wages, and 
participation in income support programs; additional questions from topical modules change 
each wave.  
 
For this analysis, the 1996 and 2001 data is pooled. The 1996 SIPP panel includes interviews 
from December 1995 through March 2000. The 2001 panel includes interviews from December 
2000 through January 2004. The data is reshaped to be in person-month format and there is one 
observation per person per month. The data for this analysis is drawn from topical modules two 
and four, which occurred during waves two and four. The current employment and earnings are 
taken from wave four, which covers the Spring of 1997 in the 1996 panel and the Spring of 2002 
in the 2001 panel.  
 
These SIPP panels provide a unique opportunity to study the effects of leave-taking and 
workplace schedules on employment and earnings. Topical module two includes a battery of 
questions on mother’s leave-taking for the birth of their first child, as well as employment and 
earnings around the time of the leave. The variables of interest for leave-taking are whether or 
not a mother took any pregnancy or maternity leave for the birth of her first child and whether 
that leave was paid or unpaid. If the effects of leave-taking on employment and earnings are 
different for first and subsequent children, then our findings will only apply to mothers with one 
child. 
 
The work schedules questions were asked in the topical modules of waves four and ten. These 
questions are similar to those asked in the Current Population Survey Work Schedules 
Supplement. The variables of interest for work schedules for this analysis is whether the hours a 
woman works are voluntary, and whether the hours are voluntary and specifically for caring 
activities, including both child care and care for other family members.  
 
  17The dependent variable for the wage models is the log of hourly wages. SIPP respondents can 
report either hourly wages or monthly earnings; we calculate hourly wages for observations 
without wage data, but with valid data for both earnings and hours per week. The wage data is 
adjusted for topcoding. (See Boushey (2004) and Boushey and Schmitt (2004) for a complete 
analysis of SIPP wage data.) The dependent variable for the employment models is whether the 
respondent indicated a positive value for wages or earnings that month. 
 
The final sample for the analysis includes women, aged 25 to 54 who worked prior to the birth of 
their first child. The analysis includes retrospective information about leave-taking for the birth 
of the first child from wave two, but uses employment and earnings from wave four, when the 
scheduling flexibility questions were asked. The estimation includes all person-month 




This analysis estimates wages using a standard OLS model. Although women’s wages are often 
estimated with a Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979), this is inappropriate here. The logic 
of the Heckman model is that given that we cannot observe the wages of women who are not 
employed, and that women who are not employed are likely to have lower wages than those who 
are employed, the estimation of wages should account for this bias. The solution to this model is 
to find variables that strongly affect the chances for observation—which here is the reservation 
wage—but not the observed outcome—which here is the actual wage. Usually, the presence of 
children is used to control for selection into employment. However, this model assumes that the 
presence of children affects women’s wages and that is why leave-taking and flexibility are 
important. Thus, OLS is the preferred specification of the wage model. The probability of 
employment is estimated using a logit model. 
 
Table A1 shows the regression results for the wage model and Table A2 shows the logit results 
for the employment models. 
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Table A1. Wage regression results 
        
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        










Received pay during 
maternity leave    0.089      0.136  0.083 
   (4.11)***      (3.13)***  (3.24)*** 
Paid maternity leave  0.065    0.070  0.065     
 (3.19)***    (1.73)*  (2.72)***     
Other paid leave used 
for maternity  0.048    0.124 0.034    
 (2.35)**    (3.04)***  (1.44)     
Self-financed maternity 
leave    -0.015     0.051 -0.024 
   (0.67)      (1.17)  (0.92) 
Quit when had child  -0.080    -0.022  -0.092     
 (3.19)***    (0.50)  (3.00)***     
Let go when had child  -0.029    0.113  -0.086     
 (0.58)    (1.45)  (1.31)     
Unpaid maternity leave  -0.013    0.011  -0.010     
 (0.60)    (0.26)  (0.37)     
Used other unpaid leave 
for maternity (including 
sick leave and vacation)  -0.023  0.036  -0.037    
 (0.83)    (0.69)  (1.09)     
Other (including self-
employed and employer 
went out of business)  -0.015  0.008  -0.008    
 (0.39)    (0.13)  (0.17)     
Schedule suits personal 
needs (school, second 
job, other)  -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 
  (0.38) (0.35) (0.32) (0.50) (0.36) (0.52) 
Schedule suits caring 
needs (child care, elder 
care, other)  0.017 0.017 0.037 0.006 0.037 0.006 
  (0.81) (0.82) (1.00) (0.25) (0.99) (0.23) 
Demographics        
Age  0.040 0.040 0.028 0.048 0.028 0.048 
 (3.51)***  (3.52)***  (1.42)  (3.40)***  (1.46)  (3.34)*** 
Age  squared  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (2.54)**  (2.56)** (1.09) (2.47)** (1.16) (2.43)** 
High-school graduate 
(less than high-school 
omitted)  0.088 0.095 0.090 0.000 0.095 0.000 
  (2.56)**  (2.75)***  (2.79)*** (.) (2.94)*** (.) 
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Table A1. Wage regression results, cont. 
        
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        










Some college  0.149  0.157  0.000  -0.194  0.000  -0.193 
  (4.34)***  (4.59)*** (.) (10.12)*** (.) (10.06)*** 
College  degree  0.351 0.359 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (9.54)***  (9.75)***  (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Post-college  degree  0.560 0.570 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.206 
  (13.55)***  (13.81)***  (.) (8.03)*** (.) (8.10)*** 
African American (white 
omitted) -0.020  -0.019  0.008  -0.032  0.011  -0.030 
 (0.99)  (0.94)  (0.24)  (1.25)  (0.32)  (1.19) 
Hispanic  -0.022 -0.022 -0.029 -0.024 -0.029 -0.025 
 (0.85)  (0.85)  (0.72)  (0.74)  (0.72)  (0.78) 
Other  race  -0.033 -0.033 0.001 -0.054 -0.007 -0.055 
 (0.97)  (0.97)  (0.01)  (1.30)  (0.12)  (1.31) 
Naturalized citizen 
(native-born omitted)  0.054 0.057 0.080 0.049 0.084 0.053 
 (1.54)  (1.62)  (1.34)  (1.15)  (1.40)  (1.23) 
Non-citizen  -0.098 -0.098 -0.113 -0.074 -0.111 -0.070 
 (2.97)***  (2.98)***  (2.28)**  (1.70)*  (2.23)**  (1.61) 
Job characteristics        
Part-time (less than 35 
hours/wk)  -0.076 -0.077 -0.117 -0.066 -0.118 -0.065 
  (5.04)*** (5.11)*** (4.52)*** (3.54)*** (4.60)*** (3.51)*** 
Union  0.113 0.115 0.214 0.088 0.213 0.090 
  (5.32)*** (5.42)*** (5.14)*** (3.50)*** (5.13)*** (3.56)*** 
Industry (Agriculture excluded) 
Mining  0.476 0.493 0.000 0.409 0.000 0.434 
  (2.04)**  (2.11)**  (.) (1.65)* (.) (1.75)* 
Construction  0.254 0.253 0.298 0.237 0.304 0.233 
 (2.42)**  (2.41)**  (1.58)  (1.87)*  (1.61)  (1.84)* 
Manufacturing:  durabales  0.148 0.149 0.225 0.091 0.237 0.093 
 (1.62)  (1.63)  (1.33)  (0.84)  (1.40)  (0.85) 
Manufacturing: 
nondurables  0.076 0.081 0.140 0.038 0.149 0.046 
 (0.82)  (0.87)  (0.83)  (0.33)  (0.88)  (0.41) 
Transportation  0.207 0.208 0.183 0.198 0.187 0.200 
 (2.18)**  (2.19)**  (1.04)  (1.74)*  (1.06)  (1.76)* 
Communications  0.156 0.162 0.137 0.129 0.147 0.135 
 (1.55)  (1.60)  (0.73)  (1.08)  (0.78)  (1.12) 
Utilities 0.165  0.162 0.331 0.090 0.329 0.091 
 (1.38)  (1.36)  (1.51)  (0.63)  (1.50)  (0.64) 
Wholesale  Trade  0.096 0.099 0.219 0.017 0.224 0.019 
 (1.02)  (1.04)  (1.28)  (0.15)  (1.30)  (0.16) 
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Table A1. Wage regression results, cont. 
        
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        










Retail  trade  -0.198 -0.193 -0.089 -0.253 -0.080 -0.244 
  (2.22)**  (2.17)** (0.53) (2.36)** (0.48) (2.28)** 
Finance  0.108 0.110 0.208 0.051 0.212 0.054 
 (1.20)  (1.23)  (1.24)  (0.48)  (1.26)  (0.51) 
Private Household 
Services  0.075 0.076 0.445 -0.211 0.501 -0.230 
  (0.40) (0.40) (1.46)  (0.88) (1.65)* (0.96) 
Business Services  0.033  0.039  0.085  -0.003  0.092  0.006 
 (0.36)  (0.42)  (0.50)  (0.03)  (0.54)  (0.06) 
Personal Services  -0.054  -0.050  0.126  -0.202  0.133  -0.198 
 (0.56)  (0.52)  (0.73)  (1.64)  (0.77)  (1.61) 
EntertainRec. Services  -0.122  -0.126  0.090  -0.230  0.087  -0.238 
 (1.22)  (1.25)  (0.50)  (1.88)*  (0.48)  (1.95)* 
Hospitals  0.178 0.183 0.081 0.147 0.089 0.154 
 (1.98)**  (2.03)**  (0.46)  (1.38)  (0.51)  (1.44) 
Medical  Services  0.087 0.090 0.134 0.051 0.140 0.055 
 (0.97)  (1.00)  (0.79)  (0.48)  (0.83)  (0.52) 
Educational Services  -0.189  -0.187  0.031  -0.254  0.032  -0.250 
  (2.12)**  (2.10)** (0.18) (2.40)** (0.19) (2.35)** 
Social  Services  -0.216 -0.217 -0.008 -0.304 -0.010 -0.305 
  (2.34)**  (2.35)** (0.05) (2.76)*** (0.06) (2.77)*** 
Other Professional 
Services  0.053 0.057 0.115 0.000 0.133 0.005 
 (0.58)  (0.63)  (0.65)  (0.00)  (0.75)  (0.04) 
Forestry 0.009  -0.005  0.000  -0.033  0.000  -0.055 
  (0.02)  (0.01) (.) (0.07) (.) (0.12) 
Public  Administration  0.044 0.046 0.058 0.010 0.068 0.012 
 (0.49)  (0.50)  (0.33)  (0.09)  (0.39)  (0.12) 
Armed Forces  0.213  0.215  0.564  -0.033  0.553  -0.027 
 (0.71)  (0.72)  (1.33)  (0.08)  (1.30)  (0.07) 
Occupation (Executive, Administrative, and Managerial, excluded) 
Professional  Specialty  0.011 0.010 -0.150 0.024 -0.148 0.021 
  (0.48)  (0.42) (2.33)** (0.91) (2.30)** (0.83) 
Technicians and Related 
Support  -0.082 -0.086 -0.105 -0.084 -0.109 -0.089 
  (2.52)**  (2.64)***  (1.32) (2.30)** (1.37) (2.42)** 
Sales  -0.166 -0.169 -0.226 -0.133 -0.233 -0.137 
  (5.75)*** (5.84)*** (4.83)*** (3.56)*** (4.98)*** (3.68)*** 
Administrative Support , 
Including Clerical  -0.237 -0.237 -0.196 -0.255 -0.194 -0.257 
  (11.35)***  (11.34)*** (5.14)*** (10.09)*** (5.09)*** (10.14)*** 
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Table A1. Wage regression results, cont. 
            
  (1)  (2)  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
        
No more than 
high-school 
degree 
Some college or 
more 






Services  -0.575  -0.578  -0.739 -0.532 -0.781  -0.520 
  (3.13)***  (3.14)***  (2.62)*** (2.21)** (2.78)***  (2.16)** 
Protective  Services  -0.112  -0.121  -0.013 -0.146 -0.015  -0.156 
  (1.19)  (1.29)  (0.08) (1.29) (0.09)  (1.38) 
Services, except 
Household  and  Protective  -0.439  -0.441  -0.488 -0.410 -0.493  -0.415 
  (15.82)***  (15.91)***  (11.15)*** (10.93)*** (11.29)***  (11.04)*** 
Farming, Forestry, and 
Fishing  -0.414  -0.415  -0.324 -0.499 -0.331  -0.500 
  (3.23)***  (3.24)***  (1.78)* (2.85)*** (1.82)*  (2.85)*** 
Precision Production, 
Craft, and Repair  -0.258  -0.259  -0.231  -0.304  -0.236  -0.306 
  (5.18)***  (5.19)***  (3.35)*** (4.18)*** (3.42)***  (4.21)*** 
Machine Operators, 
Assemblers, and 
Inspectors  -0.406  -0.407  -0.430 -0.372 -0.435  -0.377 
  (10.01)***  (10.03)***  (7.46)*** (6.00)*** (7.57)***  (6.07)*** 
Transportation and 
Material  Moving  -0.222  -0.229  -0.166 -0.257 -0.176  -0.264 
 (3.38)***  (3.49)***  (1.62)  (3.07)***  (1.72)*  (3.15)*** 
Handlers, Equipment 
Cleaners, Helpers, and 
Laborers  -0.302  -0.303  -0.285 -0.357 -0.293  -0.365 
  (4.96)***  (4.96)***  (3.83)*** (3.54)*** (3.94)***  (3.61)*** 
Armed  Forces  -0.382  -0.359  0.000 -0.176 0.000  -0.159 
  (0.80)  (0.75)  (.) (0.31) (.)  (0.28) 
Middle Atlantic (New 
England omitted)  -0.016  -0.018  -0.044 -0.004 -0.046  -0.004 
  (0.53)  (0.59)  (0.84) (0.12) (0.88)  (0.10) 
E. North Central  -0.078  -0.079  -0.070  -0.083  -0.073  -0.083 
  (2.64)***  (2.70)***  (1.42) (2.30)** (1.48)  (2.31)** 
W. North Central  -0.155  -0.156  -0.108  -0.173  -0.105  -0.175 
  (4.77)***  (4.83)***  (1.89)* (4.41)*** (1.84)*  (4.46)*** 
South  Atlantic  -0.149  -0.150  -0.152 -0.151 -0.156  -0.151 
  (4.97)***  (5.01)***  (2.97)*** (4.12)*** (3.06)***  (4.12)*** 
E. South Central  -0.252  -0.252  -0.221  -0.268  -0.222  -0.266 
  (6.92)***  (6.93)***  (3.61)*** (6.00)*** (3.61)***  (5.95)*** 
W. South Central  -0.124  -0.126  -0.091  -0.140  -0.098  -0.138 
 (3.83)***  (3.87)***  (1.61)  (3.53)***  (1.75)*  (3.48)*** 
Mountain  -0.140  -0.142  -0.131 -0.155 -0.130  -0.158 
  (3.82)***  (3.89)***  (2.21)** (3.39)*** (2.19)**  (3.46)*** 
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Table A1. Wage regression results, cont. 
         
  (1)  (2) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        










Pacific  0.039  0.037 0.056 0.036 0.054 0.034 
  (1.30)  (1.20) (1.04) (0.97) (1.01) (0.93) 
1997 (1996 omitted)  0.042  0.042  0.030  0.033  0.039  0.035 
  (1.31)  (1.28) (0.59) (0.79) (0.78) (0.84) 
2001  0.134  0.135 0.158 0.123 0.161 0.129 
  (3.78)***  (3.79)*** (2.74)*** (2.75)*** (2.80)*** (2.88)*** 
2002  0.155  0.155 0.106 0.159 0.117 0.162 
  (4.57)***  (4.57)*** (1.97)** (3.69)*** (2.18)** (3.75)*** 
Constant  1.549  1.516 1.733 1.783 1.663 1.771 
  (6.85)***  (6.70)*** (4.50)*** (6.37)*** (4.31)*** (6.33)*** 
Observations  5102  5102 1530 3572 1530 3572 
R-squared  0.42  0.41 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.37 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A2. Employment regression results 
      












Received pay during maternity  leave   1.973  2.241 
   (0.195)***  (0.343)*** 
Paid maternity leave  1.186    1.299   
 (0.112)*    (0.212)   
Other paid leave used for maternity  1.721    1.367   
 (0.167)***    (0.229)*   
Self-financed maternity leave    1.091    0.655 
   (0.109)   (0.106)*** 
Quit when had child  0.619    0.187   
  (0.066)***  (0.032)***  
Let go when had child  0.774    0.299   
 (0.156)    (0.080)***   
Unpaid maternity leave  1.083    1.066   
  (0.107)  (0.181)  
Used other unpaid leave for maternity 
(including sick leave and vacation)  1.008    1.047   
  (0.128)  (0.235)  
Other (including self-employed and 
employer went out of business)  0.491    0.488   
  (0.072)***  (0.110)***  
Demographics      
Age of mother's oldest child  1.066  1.056  1.209  1.153 
  (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.023)*** (0.021)*** 
Children 0 to 5  0.603  0.603  0.767  0.761 
 (0.044)***  (0.044)***  (0.091)**  (0.087)** 
Children 6 to 12  0.772  0.790  0.939  1.021 
 (0.060)***  (0.061)***  (0.108)  (0.112) 
Children 13 to 17  0.912  0.940  0.548  0.628 
 (0.101)  (0.103)  (0.091)***  (0.100)*** 
Age  0.818 0.819 0.807 0.839 
  (0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.065)***  (0.066)** 
Age  squared  1.002 1.002 1.002 1.002 
 (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)**  (0.001)* 
High-school graduate (less than high-
school omitted)  1.537 1.554 0.917 0.960 
 (0.199)***  (0.200)***  (0.174)  (0.177) 
  24 
Table A2. Employment regression results, cont. 
      












Some  college  1.731 1.764 1.229 1.296 
 (0.220)***  (0.223)***  (0.232)  (0.239) 
College  degree  1.560 1.572 0.989 0.994 
 (0.211)***  (0.211)***  (0.196)  (0.192) 
Post-college  degree  2.071 2.085 1.573 1.609 
 (0.319)***  (0.318)***  (0.370)*  (0.367)** 
African American (white omitted)  1.507  1.502  1.273  1.330 
 (0.160)***  (0.159)***  (0.218)  (0.222)* 
Hispanic  1.299 1.300 1.042 1.022 
 (0.142)**  (0.141)**  (0.174)  (0.165) 
Other  race  1.605 1.589 1.004 0.979 
 (0.238)***  (0.235)***  (0.224)  (0.211) 
Naturalized citizen (native-born 
omitted)  0.858 0.855 1.546 1.485 
 (0.127)  (0.126)  (0.404)*  (0.375) 
Non-citizen  0.680 0.664 0.646 0.591 
 (0.086)***  (0.084)***  (0.115)**  (0.101)*** 
Never married (Married/cohabitating 
omitted)  1.393 1.402 1.279 1.263 
 (0.172)***  (0.171)***  (0.240)  (0.229) 
Widowed  2.062 2.054 1.725 1.678 
  (0.211)*** (0.210)*** (0.281)*** (0.269)*** 
Divorced/separated  0.955 0.903 2.922 2.769 
 (0.310)  (0.288)  (1.773)*  (1.690)* 
Middle Atlantic (New England  omitted) 0.873 0.873 0.650 0.690 
 (0.112)  (0.111)  (0.118)**  (0.120)** 
E. North Central  0.997  0.986  1.154  1.156 
  (0.126) (0.123) (0.213) (0.206) 
W. North Central  1.151  1.170  1.893  1.920 
 (0.164)  (0.166)  (0.435)***  (0.427)*** 
0.874 0.875 1.106 1.110 
  (0.110) (0.109) (0.204) (0.197) 
E. South Central  1.176  1.172  1.107  1.160 
  (0.196) (0.194) (0.276) (0.280) 
W. South Central  0.829  0.826  1.070  1.055 
  (0.115) (0.114) (0.222) (0.210) 
Mountain  0.700 0.694 1.006 0.966 
 (0.106)**  (0.104)**  (0.224)  (0.208) 
Pacific  0.789 0.801 1.144 1.156 
 (0.101)*  (0.102)*  (0.217)  (0.212) 
South  Atlantic 
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Table A2. Employment regression results, cont. 
      












1997 (1996 omitted)  0.952  0.954  1.231  1.239 
  (0.139) (0.138) (0.243) (0.236) 
2001  0.840 0.826 2.061 2.038 
 (0.134)  (0.130)  (0.470)***  (0.448)*** 
2002  0.790 0.775 1.885 1.819 
 (0.120)  (0.117)*  (0.396)***  (0.369)*** 
One labor market breaks (continuous 
work history omitted)  0.390  0.370  0.321  0.267 
  (0.023)*** (0.021)*** (0.029)*** (0.023)*** 
Two labor market breaks  0.487  0.458  0.740  0.564 
 (0.056)***  (0.052)***  (0.140)  (0.103)*** 
Three labor market breaks  0.383  0.375  1.319  1.108 
 (0.087)***  (0.085)***  (0.678)  (0.563) 
Four or more labor market breaks  0.197  0.204  0.298  0.299 
  (0.053)*** (0.055)*** (0.106)*** (0.102)*** 
Observations  7548 7548 7548 7548 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 